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JURISDICTIONAL S1ATEMENT
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review this matter pursuant to Utah Code
§§ 78A-3-102(3)0') and 78A-4-103(2)0).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

WAS THE 1 RIAL COURT CORRECT IN CONCLUDING THAT ALL
CLEAN IS NOT ENTITLED TO A MECHANICS' LIEN UNDER UTAH
CODE § 38-1-3?

Standard of Review
Since All Clean, Inc. d.b.a. The Flood Co. (hereinafter "All Clean") has not
assigned error to the operative findings of fact or adequately marshaled the evidence in
support of the operative findings of fact, whether All Clean is entitled to a mechanics'
lien under Utah Code § 38-1-3 is a question of statutory interpretation and therefore
constitutes a question of law for which "no deference need be given the trial court's
conclusions." Foothill Park, LC v. Judston, Inc., 2008 UT App 113, If 4, 182 P.3d 924.
Preservation for Appeal
This issue was addressed in closing arguments at trial. [R. 295 (Trial Transcript at
63, 82)].
II.

DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FAILING TO AWARD TIMBERLINE
PROPERTIES ITS ATTORNEYS' FEES PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE §
38-1-18 AS THE "SUCCESSFUL PARTY" ON ALL CLEAN'S
MECHANICS' LIEN CLAIM?

Standard of Review
Since the operative facts are not disputed, the issue of whether the trial court erred
in failing to award attorneys' fees to Timberline Properties, James B. Farreil, and Farreil
1

J. DeHart (hereinafter collectively "Timberline Properties") is a question of statutory
interpretation and therefore constitutes a question of law for which "no deference need be
given the trial court's conclusions." Foothill Park, LC v. Judston, Inc., 2008 UT App
1 1 3 4 4 , 182 P.3d 924.
Preservation for Appeal
The issue of attorneys' fees under section 38-1-18 was addressed in closing
arguments at trial. [R. 295 (Trial Transcript at 85-86)].

STATUTES DETERMINATIVE ON APPEAL
I.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-3 (2007).

Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons performing any services or furnishing or
renting any materials or equipment used in the construction, alteration, or improvement
of any building or structure or improvement to any premises in any manner and licensed
architects and engineers and artisans who have furnished designs, plats, plans, maps,
specifications, drawings, estimates of cost, surveys or superintendence, or who have
rendered other like professional service, or bestowed labor, shall have a lien upon the
property upon or concerning which they have rendered service, performed labor, or
furnished or rented materials or equipment for the value of the service rendered, labor
performed, or materials or equipment furnished or rented by each respectively, whether at
the instance of the owner or of any other person acting by his authority as agent,
contractor, or otherwise except as the lien is barred under Section 38-11-107 of the
Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act. This lien shall attach only to
such interest as the owner may have in the property.
O.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-18 (2009).

(1) Except as provided in Section 38-11-107 and in Subsection (2), in any action brought
to enforce any lien under this chapter the successful party shall be entitled to recover a
reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed as costs in the
action.
(2) A person who files a wrongful lien as provided in Section 38-1-25 is not entitled to
recover attorneys5 fees under Subsection (1).
2

(3) A party against whom any action is brought to enforce a lien under this chapter may
make an offer of judgment pursuant to Rule 68 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. If
the offer is not accepted and the judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not more
favorable than the offer, the offeree shall pay the costs and attorneys' fees incurred by the
offeror after the offer was made.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NYI'IIKMWTHECASE.
All Clean asserted causes of action against Timberline Properties for unjust

enrichment and to foreclose a mechanics' lien. [R. 1, 5-6 (Complaintffif28-34)]. The
trial court found in favor of All Clean on its unjust enrichment claim and awarded
judgment against Timberline Properties in the total amount of $ 1,841.07. [R. 263, 26364 (Judgment f 1); R. 266, 269 (Conclusions of Law ^ 5)]. However, the trial court
found in favor of Timberline Properties on All Clean's mechanics' lien claim, holding
that "[t]his is not a mechanic's lien case because the work done by [All Clean] is not the
type which entitles [All Clean] to have a lien upon the property of [Timberline
Properties]." [R. 266, 269 (Conclusions of Law If 6)].
The trial court did not award either party its attorneys' fees. [R. 263, 263-64
(Judgment ^| 1)]. After the trial Timberline Properties remitted a check to All Clean in
the amount of $ 1,841.07—the full amount of the Judgment—to fully satisfy the
Judgment. See Affidavit of Farrell J. DeHart 14, attached hereto as Exhibit "A". All
Clean negotiated the check and then served its Notice of Appeal. [Affidavit of Farrell J.
DeHart If 5, attached hereto as Exhibit "A"; R. 271, 271-73 (Notice of Appeal)].

3

Accordingly, at issue on appeal is whether All Clean waived its right to appeal the
Judgment or is otherwise estopped from attacking the Judgment on appeal pursuant to the
acceptance-of-the-benefits doctrine. If the acceptance-of-the-benefits doctrine does not
preclude All Clean's appeal, the Court must interpret and apply Utah Code § 38-1-3 to
the trial court's unchallenged findings of fact to determine whether the trial court
correctly concluded that All Clean was not entitled to a mechanics' lien. The Court must
also determine whether the trial court erred in failing to award Timberline Properties its
attorneys' fees as the successful party on All Clean's mechanics' lien claim.
II.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS/DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW.
All Clean filed a Complaint on December 19, 2008. [R. 1, 1-15 (Complaint)]. A

short bench trial was conducted before the Honorable Judge W. Brent West on February
1, 2010. [R. 237, 237-38 (Bench Trial Minutes); R. 295 (Bench Trial Transcript)].
Following the bench trial Judge West concluded as follows: (1) that All Clean was
entitled to recover $1,841.07 pursuant to its unjust enrichment claim; (2) that All Clean
was not entitled to recover on its mechanics' lien claim; and (3) that neither party was
entitled to an award of attorneys' fees. [R. 295 (Trial Transcript at 86-90); R. 266, 269
(Conclusions of Lawfflf5-6)].
STATEMENT OF FACTS
All Clean performed "work" or a "repair" on Property owned by Timberline
Properties. [R. 266, 267 (Findings of Factfflf2,6)]. Timberline Properties paid All Clean
$3,275.00. [R. 266, 268 (Findings of Fact U 10)]. After accepting Timberline Properties'
4

$3,275.00 payment, All Clean asserted that there was an outstanding balance of
$1,947.38. [R. 266, 268 (Findings of Fact ^ 11)]. All Clean then filed a "Notice of
Mechanics' Lien" and initiated this lawsuit. [R. 266, 268 (Findings of Fact If 12)].
The causes of action asserted by All Clean against Timberline Properties included
unjust enrichment and mechanics' lien foreclosure. [R. 1, 5-6 (Complaintfflj28-34)]. At
the conclusion of a short bench trial the trial court found in favor of All Clean on its
unjust enrichment claim and awarded judgment against Timberline Properties in the total
amount of $1,841.07. [R. 263, 263-64 (Judgment % 1); R. 266, 269 (Conclusions of Law

1f5)].
However, the trial court found in favor of Timberline Properties on All Clean's
mechanics' lien claim, holding that "[t]his is not a mechanic's lien case because the work
done by [All Clean] is not the type which entitles [All Clean] to have a lien upon the
property of [Timberline Properties]." [R. 266, 269 (Conclusions of Law f 6)]. The trial
court did not award either party its attorneys' fees. [R. 263, 263-64 (Judgment ^} 1)].
In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the trial court intentionally
characterized the work performed by All Clean generally as "the work" or "the repair."
[R. 266, 267 (Findings of Fact U 6), 269 (Conclusions of Lawffif5-6)]. All Clean's
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law included the following paragraph
specifically identifying the work allegedly performed:
The work done by [All Clean] included the following: blocking and padding
furniture; equipment setup, take down, and monitoring; water extraction from
floors; application of antimicrobial agent; operation of air movers (fans) and
dehumidifiers; and cleaning and deodorizing of carpets.
5

[R. 254, 255 (Proposed Findings of Fact % 6)].
Timberline Properties objected to this proposed finding of fad as follows:
The Court's ruling from the bench did not include a finding with respect to the
specific work performed by Plaintiff. The Court only referred to the "work or the
repair," which is consistent with the evidence submitted inasmuch as Plaintiff did
not present any testimony with respect to the specific work [] performed.
[R. 241, 242 (Objection to Proposed Finding No. 6)]. On March 16, 2010, the trial court
held a teleconference with counsel for All Clean and Timberline Properties to review
Timberline Properties' objections to the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law. [R. 253, 253 (Telephone Conference Worksheet); R. 262, 262 (Minutes of
Telephone Conference)].
As evidenced by the trial court's ultimate Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, Timberline Properties' objection to a specific identification of "Ihe work" or "the
repairs" allegedly performed by All Clean was well-taken by the trial court. [R. 266,
266-69 (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law)]. Indeed, All Clean concedes that
"[t]he trial court [] refused to make any detailed finding of fact identifying or describing
'the work done by [All Clean].'" Brief of the Appellant at 13.
On April 2, 2010, the trial court signed its Judgment and its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law. [R. 263, 264 (Judgment); R. 266, 269 (Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law)]. On March 22,2010, Timberline Properties tendered a check to
All Clean in the amount of $1,841.07—the full amount of the Judgment— to fully satisfy
the Judgment. [Affidavit of Farrell J. DeHart If 4, attached hereto as Exhibit "A"]. On
6

April 7, 2010, All Clean negotiated the check. [Affidavit of Farrell J. DeHart ^ 5,
attached hereto as Exhibit "A"]. On April 30, 2010, All Clean initiated this appeal by
serving its Notice of Appeal. [R. 271, 271-73 (Notice of Appeal)].
Thereafter Timberline Properties expressed to All Clean that it was selling a piece
of property not involved in this lawsuit (but located in Weber County where the
Judgment had been recorded) and requested that All Clean execute a Satisfaction of
Judgment to acknowledge that the Judgment had been paid in full for the purpose of
clearing title to the property. [Affidavit of Garrett A. Walker ^ 4, attached hereto as
Exhibit "B"].
All Clean refused to execute a Satisfaction of Judgment. [Affidavit of Garrett A.
Walker ^f 5-6, attached hereto as Exhibit "B"]. Although the property was still sold to a
third-party, Timberline Properties was forced to place $3,673.00 in escrow since All
Clean refused to execute a Satisfaction of Judgment acknowledging that the Judgment
had been paid in full. [Affidavit of Farrell J. DeHartfflf6-7, attached hereto as Exhibit
"A"]. The funds are still being held in escrow. [Affidavit of Farrell J. DeHart ^f 8,
attached hereto as Exhibit "A"].
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
I.

ALL CLEAN WAIVED ITS RIGHT TO APPEAL OR IS OTHERWISE
ESTOPPED FROM ATTACKING THE JUDGMENT ON APPEAL
PURSUANT TO THE ACCEPTANCE-OF-THE-BENEFITS DOCTRINE,
The trial court found in favor of All Clean on its unjust enrichment claim and in

favor of Timberline Properties on All Clean's mechanics' lien claim. [R. 266, 269
7

(Conclusions of Lawffif5-6)]. All Clean then accepted the benefits of the Judgment by
obtaining payment of the Judgment in full. [Affidavit of Farrell J. DeHartfflf4-5,
attached hereto as Exhibit "A"]. As a result, All Clean waived its right to appeal or is
otherwise estopped from attacking the Judgment on appeal pursuant to the acceptance-ofthe-benefits doctrine since All Clean's mechanics' lien claim is "inextricably tied" to its
unjust enrichment claim.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT ALL CLEAN IS NOT
ENTITLED TO A MECHANICS' LIEN.
Mechanics' lien claimants bear the burden of establishing entitlement to a

mechanics' lien. See, e.g., Govert Copier Painting v. Van Leeuwen, 801 P.2d 163, 172
(Utah Ct. App. 1990) (holding that "[t]he burden of proof is on [the lien claimant] to
prove that it is entitled to the lien and has complied with the statute"). Among other
requirements, Utah Code § 38-1-3 defines what services, material, and equipment must
be used to entitle the person performing the services or furnishing or renting the materials
or equipment to a mechanics' lien. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-3 (2007).
In this case, All Clean did not provide the trial court with evidence sufficient to
enable the trial court to find that the "work" or "repairs" performed by All Clean entitled
All Clean to a mechanics' lien. Even if the trial court's findings of fact are disregarded
and All Clean is allowed to assert it performed specific "work" or "repairs," the "work"
or "repairs" performed by All Clean were still not used in a manner that would entitle All
Clean to a mechanics' lien under section 38-1-3.

8

IIL

ATTORNEYS' FEES.
The trial court found in favor of Timberline Properties on All Clean's mechanics'

lien claim. [R. 266, 269 (Conclusions of Law ^ 6)]. Consequently, Timberline Properties
was the "successful party" and should have been awarded its attorneys' fees. See UTAH
CODE ANN. § 38-1-18 (2009). Timberline Properties should also be awarded its
attorneys' fees on appeal. Reeves v. Steinfeldt, 915 P.2d 1073, 1079 (Utah Ct. App.
1996) (remanding a mechanics' lien case to the trial court for an award of attorneys fees
incurred by the property owner in successfully defending the appeal).
ARGUMENTS
All Clean waived its right to appeal or is otherwise estopped from attacking the
trial court's Judgment on appeal—and consequently this appeal should be dismissed—
pursuant to its acceptance of the benefit of the Judgment. In any event, All Clean is not
entitled to a mechanics' lien under Utah Code § 38-1-3. Although the trial court was
correct in its determination that All Clean was not entitled to a mechanics' lien, it erred in
not awarding attorneys' fees to Timberline Properties pursuant to Utah Code § 38-1-18.
I.

ALL CLEAN WAIVED ITS RIGHT TO APPEAL OR IS OTHERWISE
ESTOPPED FROM ATTACKING THE JUDGMENT ON APPEAL
PURSUANT TO THE ACCEPTANCE-OF-THE-BENEFITS DOCTRINE.
All Clean waived its right to appeal the trial court's Judgment by subsequently

accepting the benefits of the Judgment. Alternatively, accepting the benefits of the
judgment resulted in All Clean being estopped from attacking the Judgment on appeal.
"Utah courts have long held that if a judgment is voluntarily paid, which is accepted, and
9

a judgment satisfied, the controversy has become moot and the right to appeal is waived."
Turville v. J & J Properties, L.C., 2006 UT App. 305, t 44, 145 P.3d 1146 (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). Similarly, "one who accepts a benefit under a
judgment is estopped from later attacking the judgment on appeal." See Trees v. Lewis,
738 P.2d 612, 613 (Utah 1987).
On April 2, 2010, the trial court signed its Judgment and its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law. [R. 263, 264 (Judgment); R. 266, 269 (Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law)]. On March 22, 2010, Timberline Properties tendered a check to
All Clean in the amount of $1,841.07—the full amount of the Judgment—to fully satisfy
the Judgment. [Affidavit of Farrell J. DeHart ^J 4, attached hereto as Exhibit "A"]. On
April 7, 2010, All Clean negotiated the check. [Affidavit of Farrell J. DeHart If 5,
attached hereto as Exhibit "A"]. This constitutes an acceptance of the benefits of the
Judgment. However, All Clean nevertheless initiated this appeal by serving its Notice of
Appeal on April 30, 2010. [R. 271, 271-73 (Notice of Appeal)].
Although Utah's courts have acknowledged one exception to the acceptance-ofthe-benefits doctrine, this exception is inapplicable to this case. "An exception to this
rule exists only if the appeal relates to a separate and distinct part of the controversy and
the disposition of one cannot affect the disposition of the other." Robertson v. GEM Ins.
Co., 828 P.2d 496, 504 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
We are in agreement with the general rule that if a judgment is voluntarily paid,
which is accepted, and a judgment satisfied, the controversy has become moot and
the right to appeal is waived. This is based upon the reasoning that when a
controversy has come to rest the litigation should cease.... Therefore, the general
10

rule just stated does not usually prevent an appeal as to separate and independent
claims where the controversy has not so come to rest. If a judgment is entered as
to one part of a controversy, which is separate and distinct from another part, and
the disposition of the latter cannot affect the disposition of the former, a party may
accept the money or property to which he is entitled, and not be deemed to waive
his right to appeal as to other independent claims which the court refused to grant.
Jensen v. Eddy, 514 P.2d 1142, 1143 (Utah 1973).
In this case the controversy has become moot and the right to appeal has been
waived by All Clean because its mechanics' lien claim is not "separate and independent"
or "separate and distinct" from its unjust enrichment claim. The transaction giving rise to
All Clean's mechanics' lien claim is the same transaction giving rise to its unjust
enrichment claim. Indeed, All Clean's mechanics' lien claim cannot stand independent
of its unjust enrichment claim because the security afforded by a mechanics' lien
presupposes an underlying debt.
That a mechanics' lien claim is not "separate and distinct" from an unjust
enrichment claim is underscored by the repeated use of the phrases "inextricably tied"
and "inextricably intertwined" by Utah's courts in describing the relationship between
mechanics' lien claims and unjust enrichment/breach of contract claims. See Ellsworth
Paulsen Const Co. v. 51-SPR, LLC,

2006 UT App. 353, If 47, 144 P.3d 261 ("the

breach of contract claim here was so inextricably tied to the mechanic's lien claim . . . it
almost goes without saying that a breach of contract claim is typically such an integral
part of a mechanics' lien claim"); Stonecreek Landscaping, LLC v. Bell, 2008 UT App.
144, \ 9, WL 1822192 ("Stonecreek's claims for breach of contract and unjust
enrichment, however, are so inextricably tied to its mechanic's lien claim") (internal
11

quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Cameron & Co., Inc. v. Kelly, 2002 UT
App. 320, If 3, 2002 WL 31204494 (utilizing the phrase "inextricably intertwined").1
The interwoven relationship between All Clean's mechanics' lien claim and its
unjust enrichment claim is further manifest when it is considered that the Court may
affirm the trial court's judgment regarding All Clean's mechanics' lie*i claim on alternate
grounds that could affect the disposition of the trial court's judgment regarding All
Clean's unjust enrichment claim.
It is well settled that an appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from if
it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even though
such ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be the basis of
its ruling or action, and this is true even though such ground or theory is not urged
or argued on appeal by appellee, was not raised in the lower court, and was not
considered or passed on by the lower court.
Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ]fl0, 52 P.3d 1158 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
For example, the Court may conclude that the record does not support the
existence of a debt underlying All Clean's mechanics' lien claim. A legal conclusion to
that effect would necessarily implicate the trial court's judgment regarding All Clean's
unjust enrichment claim and could be drawn from the trial court's findings of fact and
conclusions of law relating to the doctrine of accord and satisfaction. [R. 266, 268
(Findings of Factffif8-9, 11), 269 (Conclusions of Law |jf 1-4)].
1

"Published decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, and unpublished
decisions of the Court of Appeals issued on or after October 1, 1998, may be cited as
precedent in all courts of the State." UTAH R. APP. P. 30(f) (2010).
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Alternatively, the Court may conclude after examining the record that the "work"
or "repairs" performed by All Clean were such that All Clean was required to be a
licensed contractor in order to bring this lawsuit.
A contractor . . . may not.. . commence or maintain any action in any court of the
state for collection of compensation for performing any act for which a license is
required by this chapter without alleging and proving that the licensed contractor
.. was appropriately licensed when the contract sued upon was entered into, and
when the alleged cause of action arose.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 58-55-604 (2008).

Although All Clean refers to itself as a licensed contractor in the Brief of the
Appellant at 6, the trial court did not make such a finding in its findings of fact, and a
thorough review of the record reveals that that no evidence was presented to the trial
court that All Clean was ever a licensed contractor. [R. 266, 266-68 (Findings of Fact);
R. 295 (Trial Transcript)]. Since All Clean did not allege and prove at trial that it was a
licensed contractor, a conclusion by this Court that the "work" or "repairs" performed by
All Clean were of a nature that required All Clean to prove that it was a licensed
contractor in order to commence and maintain this action would necessarily implicate the
trial court's judgment regarding All Clean's unjust enrichment claim.
Given that the Court's disposition of All Clean's mechanics' lien claim could
affect the trial court's disposition of All Clean's unjust enrichment claim, it cannot be
argued that All Clean's mechanics' lien claim is "separate and distinct" from its unjust
enrichment claim. Consequently, the acceptance-of-the-benefits doctrine is applicable to
the facts presented by this case and All Clean's appeal should be dismissed.
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This conclusion is supported by the purpose of the acceptance-of-the-benefits
doctrine: to protect the successful party from a shift in the burden of risk.
We think that this rule is more than a technicality of common law designed to
ensnare the unwary; the rule embodies a valid protection of the successful party in
the trial court. An appellant who accepts the benefits of a judgment from which he
is appealing accomplishes a significant shift in the burden of risk; he exposes the
respondent to the possibility not only to a possible loss on appeal, but also the
potential loss of the benefit he has provided to the appellant.
See Trees v. Lewis, 738 P.2d 612, 613 (Utah 1987).
In this case, Timberline Properties was the successful party on All Clean's
mechanics' lien claim. [R. 266, 269 (Conclusions of Law ^f 6)]. By accepting Timberline
Properties' check in the full amount of the judgment, All Clean has exposed Timberline
Properties not only to the risk of loss on appeal but also to the risk that Timberline
Properties will be forced to try to collect what it has already paid to All Clean if the Court
finds that there is no underlying debt secured by the mechanics' lien claim. The
acceptance-of-the-benefits doctrine was designed to avoid this scenario.
In addition, other legal theories that have been used by the courts to rationalize
application of the acceptance-of-the-benefits doctrine also support its application in this
case. "The Utah Supreme Court has applied this general doctrine using diverse legal
theories in its rationale, depending on the particular circumstances of the case."
Cingolani v. Utah Power & Light Co., 790 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah Ct, App. 1990). These
legal theories include waiver and estoppel. Id.
In this case, All Clean waived its right to appeal the judgment by the act of
negotiating a check from Timberline Properties for the full amount of the judgment. All
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Clean should also be estopped from appealing the Judgment. Acceptance of the benefit
of the Judgment is inconsistent with appealing the Judgment, and Timberline Properties
has suffered a determent from All Clean's negotiation of the check.
Although the Judgment has been paid in full, All Clean has refused to execute a
Satisfaction of Judgment. [Affidavit of Garrett A. Walker ffl| 5-6, attached hereto as
Exhibit "B"]. Consequently, Timberline Properties was forced to place $3,673.00 in
escrow in conjunction with its sale of a piece of property not even involved in this lawsuit
(but located in Weber County where the Judgment had been recorded) since the
Judgment is still encumbering the property. [Affidavit of Farrell J. DeHart ^ 6-7,
attached hereto as Exhibit "A"]. These funds are still being held in escrow. [Affidavit of
Farrell J. DeHart % 8, attached hereto as Exhibit "A"]. Accordingly, Timberline
Properties has suffered a detriment by not having access to both the money to which it is
entitled from the sale of this unrelated property and the money it already paid in full
satisfaction of the Judgment.
All Clean is also enjoying the benefits of the Judgment (its payment) without
bearing the burdens of the payment of the Judgment (the release of the judgment lien on a
parcel of property unrelated to this lawsuit). It this respect it is inequitable for All Clean
to deny Timberline Properties the benefits associated with paying the Judgment.
Furthermore, it would be inequitable to allow All Clean to effectively finance its appeal
(in whole or part) with the funds tendered by Timberline Properties in satisfaction of the
Judgment.
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It should be noted that a finding that the elements of waiver, estoppel or mootness
have been met is not a prerequisite to an application of the acceptance-of-the-benefits
doctrine. This is evident from the fact that the Utah Supreme Court has never analyzed
the applicability of the doctrine by listing the elements of waiver, estoppel or mootness.
Instead, a determination is made whether the benefits of the judgment have been accepted
and whether the issue on appeal is "separate and distinct" from the issue for which the
benefits of the judgment were accepted. See, e.g., Jensen v. Eddy, 514 P.2d 1142, 1143
(Utah 1973). These are the elements of the acceptance-of-the-benefits doctrine.
If these elements are met, the Utah Supreme Court commonly uses phrases such as
"plaintiff waived his right to appeal" or "defendant is estopped from appealing the
judgment" or "the controversy is moot" to describe the effect of the acceptance-of-thebenefits doctrine, not as an indication that the elements of the legal theories of waiver,
estoppel, or mootness had been met. "We are in agreement with the general rule that if a
judgment is voluntarily paid, which is accepted, and a judgment satisfied, the controversy
has become moot and the right to appeal is waived." Id. Similarly, "one who accepts a
benefit under a judgment is estopped from later attacking the judgment on appeal." See
Trees v. Lewis, 738 P.2d 612, 613 (Utah 1987).
That the acceptance-of-the-benefits doctrine is a free-standing legal principal not
dependent upon the elements of wavier, estoppel or mootness is highlighted by the
following quotation:
Although the defendant wrote to the plaintiffs attorney explaining that he did not
intend to waive his right to appeal..., we held against the defendant, stating: "It
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is elementary that in case a party to an action accepts the benefits of a judgment in
his favor . . . he thereby waives his right to have said judgment reviewed on
appeal." 56 Utah at 193, 188 P. at 1118 (citations omitted).
Id. (emphasis added).
"Waiver requires three elements: (1) an existing right, benefit, or advantage; (2)
knowledge of its existence; and (3) an intention to relinquish the right." Soter's, Inc. v.
Deseret Federal Sav. & Loan Ass % 857 P.2d 935, 940 (Utah 1993). In light of the
defendant's letter that he did not intend to waive his right to appeal, it is clear that the
court's statement that "he thereby waives his right to have said judgment reviewed on
appeal" was intended to describe the effect of the application of the acceptance-of-thebenefits doctrine, not that application of the doctrine depended upon the elements of
waiver. See Trees, 738 P.2d at 613.
Furthermore, the fact that All Clean refused to execute a Satisfaction of Judgment
does not preclude application of the acceptance-of-the-benefits doctrine. "Formal
execution of a satisfaction of judgment is not a prerequisite of the principal that voluntary
acquiescence waives the right to appeal." 4 CJS Appeal & Error § 280 (2007). Although
the execution of a satisfaction of judgment is relevant evidence tending to prove that the
right to appeal a judgment has been waived, the Utah Supreme Court has implicitly
agreed that the existence of a satisfaction of judgment is not a prerequisite to such a
determination. See Trees, 738 P.2d at 613.
In Trees there is no mention of any filing of a satisfaction of judgment by either of
the parties to the dispute. Id. However, Utah Supreme Court still held "that [Lewis] lost
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his right to appeal by acquiescing in and accepting benefits under the judgment he now
assails . . . by giving up possession of the property and accepting the money tendered by
[Trees]." Id.
In supporting this holding the Utah Supreme Court cited to Hollingsworth v.
Farmers Insurance Co. and characterized it as a case "finding no right to appeal when
defendant accepted payment and executed a written satisfaction of judgment notice." Id.
The Utah Supreme Court was clearly aware that a satisfaction of judgment was presented
as evidence in Hollingsworth but apparently did not consider its existence a prerequisite
to finding that Trees "waived his right to appeal" by accepting the benefits of the
judgment. Id.
Although All Clean may not have subjectively intended to waive its right to appeal
by negotiating Timberline Properties' check for the full amount of the judgment, the Utah
Supreme Court has made clear that ignorance of the acceptance-of-the-benefit doctrine is
not a defense to its application.
Although the defendant wrote to the plaintiffs attorney explaining that he did not
intend to waive his right to appeal. .., [the Utah Supreme Court] held against the
defendant, stating: "It is elementary that in case a party to an action accepts the
benefits of a judgment in his favor . . . he thereby waives his right to have said
judgment reviewed on appeal."
Id. (quoting Ottenheimer v. Mountain States Supply Co., 188 P. 1117, 1118 (Utah 1920)).
In this case All Clean's mechanics' lien claim is inextricably tied to its unjust
enrichment claim. In accepting the money tendered by Timberline Properties in
satisfaction of the Judgment, All Clean thereby waived its right to appeal the Judgment.
18

Similarly, All Clean should be estopped from now attacking the Judgment on appeal after
accepting its benefits.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT ALL CLEAN IS NOT
ENTITLED TO A MECHANICS' LIEN.
The Court must consider the merits of All Clean's appeal if it holds that All Clean

did not waive its right to appeal the trial court's judgment or that All Clean is not
otherwise estopped from attacking the Judgment pursuant to the acceptance-of-thebenefits doctrine. In denying All Clean's mechanics' lien claim, the trial court held that
"[t]his is not a mechanic's lien case because the work done by [All Clean] is not the type
which entitles [All Clean] to have a lien upon the property of [Timberline Properties]."
[R. 266, 269 (Conclusions of Law f 6)].
Entitlement to a mechanics' lien is governed by Utah Code § 38-1-3, which
provides in relevant part:
Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons performing any services or
furnishing or renting any materials or equipment used in the construction,
alteration, or improvement of any building or structure or improvement to
any premises in any manner . . . shall have a lien upon the property upon or
concerning which they have rendered service, performed labor, or furnished
or rented materials or equipment for the value of the service rendered, labor
performed, or materials or equipment furnished or rented by each
respectively, whether at the instance of the owner or of any other person
acting by his authority as agent, contractor, or otherwise . . . .
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 38-1-3 (2007).

Recognizing that mechanics' lien statutes are remedial in nature and consequently
should be liberally construed, the overwhelming majority of courts have nevertheless
held that the statute governing entitlement to a mechanics' lien—in this case Utah Code §
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38-1-3—must be strictly construed. "A mechanic's lien statute should be liberally
construed as to the remedial portion of it, but it must be strictly construed in determining
the question as to whether the right to a lien exists." Lindemann v. Belden ConsoL Min.
& Mill. Co., 65 P. 403,404 (Colo. Ct. App. 1901).
Lakloey contends that when considering its arguments, "the tnal court erred by
failing to apply the remedial intent and effect of the mechanic's lien statutes." We
have previously observed that "there is a significant distinction between those
portions of Alaska mechanics' liens statutes which are remedial in nature, and
those portions which articulate mandatory conditions precedent to the very
creation and existence of the lien." These mandatory conditions precedent, such
as "the determination of who qualifies as a lienholder" are to be "strictly
construed."
Lakloey, Inc. v. Ballek, 211 P.3d 662, 665-66 (Alaska 2009). See also, e.g., Midwest
Biohazard Services, LLC v. Rodgers, 893 N.E.2d 1074, 1077 (Ind. App. 2008) ("Because
our mechanic's lien statute 'derogates common law, Indiana courts have strictly
construed it when determining its scope, and, accordingly, those persons entitled to
acquire and enforce such liens.'") (citation omitted); Crawford Supply Co. v. Schwartz,
919 N.E.2d 5, 12 (111. Ct. App. 2009) ("Because the rights under the [Mechanics' Lien]
Act are in derogation of the common law, the steps necessary to invoke those rights must
be strictly construed. Once a plaintiff has complied with the requirements, however, the
Act should be liberally construed to accomplish its remedial purpose.") (internal citation
omitted); DBM Consulting Engineers, Inc. v. U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co., 170 P.3d 592,
595 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007) ("Not all services that relate to property qualify for a lien, and
a lien statute is strictly construed to determine whether the lien attaches."); Badger
Lumber Co., Inc. v. Redd, 583 S.E.2d 76, 79 (W. Va. 2003) ("Mechanics' lien statutes
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must be strictly construed with reference to those requirements upon which the right
depends and liberally construed with reference to the manner in which the right is
perfected.") (quotation marks and citation omitted); Nucor Corp. v. Mohr Const Co., 763
P.2d 754, 755 (Or. Ct. App. 1988) ("Lien law is purely statutory, and the statute is strictly
construed as to whom it applies."); Port Liberie Partners v. Strober Bros., Inc., 549 A.2d
72, 74 (N.J. 1988) ("Mechanics and materialman's liens are exclusively statutory in
origin and provisions of statute giving rise to lien are to be strictly construed, while
provisions for enforcement of lien thereby created are to be liberally construed."); Hamel
v. American Continental Corp., 713 P.2d 1152, 1153 (Wyo. 1986) ("Lien laws are strictly
construed, and their scope cannot be extended."); Robert V. Clapp Co. v. Fox, 178 N.E.
586, 586 (Ohio 1931) ("Mechanics' lien statutes create rights in derogation of the
common Taw ancfshould therefore be strictly construedas to the~question whether a lien
attaches, but their procedural and remedial provisions should be liberally construed, after
the lien has been created."); Bottomly v. Rector of Grace Church, 2 Cal. 90, 90 (Cal.
1852) ("This is an action by a material-man, under the mechanics' lien l a w . . . . The
language of the act is sufficiently explicit, and must be strictly construed, because it gives
rights in derogation of the common law.").
In this case the trial court's conclusion that All Clean was not entitled to a
mechanics' lien is supported by a correct interpretation of Utah Code § 38-1-3 and an
application of that interpretation to the trial court's unchallenged findings of fact.
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A.

Interpreting Utah Code § 38-1-3.
The rules governing statutory construction are intended to aid the courts in

ascertaining the intent of the legislature.
When interpreting a statute, we turn to standard canons of statutory construction.
In so doing, our primary goal is to give effect to the legislature's intent. We first
look to the plain language of the statute and give effect to that language unless it is
ambiguous. Only where that language is ambiguous do we consult other sources
for its meaning.
Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ewart, 2007 UT 52, If 16, 167 P.3d 1011.
A statute is ambiguous when "its terms are susceptible to more than one
reasonable interpretation." Hutter v. Dig-It, Inc., 2009 UT 69, Tf 49, 219 P.3d 918.
"When a statute is ambiguous, we use extrinsic interpretive tools such as policy and
legislative intent to guide our analysis." R & R Indus. Park, LLC

v. Utah Property and

Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 2008 UT 80, If 25, 199 P.3d 917.
The interpretation of Utah Code § 38-1-3 proposed by All Clean relies heavily on
a general dictionary definition for the term "improvement" and assigns it the same
meaning each time it is used to create "two distinct categories of lienable work." See
Brief of the Appellant at 33-41. However, the Court must find that Utah Code § 38-1-3 is
ambiguous (if the Court finds that All Clean's interpretation of section 38-1-3 is
reasonable) for the following reasons: (1) the term "improvement" is a recognized term
of art; and (2) the term "improvement" has a subtle difference in meaning each time it is
used in section 38-1-3.
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First, the term "improvement" in the context of mechanics5 lien statutes is a term
of art. See, e.g., In re Payless Cashways, Inc., 230 B.R. 120, 130 (8th Cir. BAP 1999)
("Improvement is a developed term of art in Minnesota, and elsewhere, meaning work
that involves both enhancement of capital value of the realty and something permanent in
nature.") (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court of South Dakota recently cited to
the 1976 version of Webster's Third International Dictionary while noting:
An improvement in construction parlance is ordinarily defined as "a permanent
addition or betterment of real property that enhances its capital value and that
involves the expenditure of labor or money and is designed to make the property
more useful or valuable as distinguished from ordinary repairsM"
Duffield Const, Inc. v. Baldwin, 679 N.W.2d 477, 481 (S.D. 2004) (emphasis added)
(quoting Webster's Third International Dictionary 1138 (1976)).
Barron's Law Dictionary defines the term "improvement" as "any development of
land or buildings through the expenditure of money or labor that is designed to do more
than merely replace, repair, or restore to the original condition." Barron's Law
Dictionary, 5th Ed. 243 (2003) (emphasis added). Similarly, American Jurisprudence,
specifically addressing mechanics' lien statutes, notes that the term "improvement" is
generally defined "as anything that enhances the value of the land, or as a valuable
addition made to property or an amelioration in its condition, that amounts to more than
mere repairs, and is intended to enhance the value, beauty, or utility of the property or to
adapt it for new or further purposes." 53 AM. JUR. 2d Mechanics' Liens § 55 (1996).
These definitions of the term "improvement" take into account the context in
which the term is being used. While there are subtle differences between each definition,
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they are all consistent to the effect that an "improvement" is something more than
cleaning, repairs or maintenance (which have the effect of maintaining the value of
property to what it was immediately prior to the event or events necessitating the
cleaning, maintenance or repair).
Second, the punctuation of Utah Code § 38-1-3 and the words surrounding each
usage of the term "improvement" evidence that the term "improvement" has a subtle
difference in meaning each time it is used. The term "construction" is a noun that means
the act or process of constructing. The term "alteration" is a noun that means the act or
process of altering. In the context of the phrase "construction, alteration, or
improvement," the term "improvement" is used as a noun to connote the act or process of
improving, which as set forth above connotes something more than merely the act or
process of cleaning, repairing or maintaining.
In contrast, the terms "building" and "structure" are both nouns describing
physical objects. The word "building" encompasses (among others) houses, apartment
complexes, and commercial skyscrapers. The word "structure" encompasses (among
others) fences, sheds, and bridges. In the context of the phrase "any building or structure
or improvement to any premises in any manner," the term "improvement" is used as a
noun to connote something physical.2 Sewer and water systems are not buildings or

2

All Clean acknowledges, in the context of the former version of section 38-1-3, that the
phrase "improvement upon land" must "be read in connection with the preceding words
'building' and 'structure.'" See Brief of the Appellant at 35. The same is true in the
context of the current version of section 38-1-3 with respect to the phrase "any building
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structures but they are commonly referred to as "improvements." See, e.g., First of
Denver Mortg. Investors v. G N. Zundel and Associates, 600 P.2d 521, 525 (Utah 1979).3
Similarly, rocks and trees used in landscaping may not be buildings or structures but they
are improvements.
That the term "improvement" as used in the phrase "any building or structure or
improvement to any premises in any manner" was intended to connote something
physical (in contrast to the act or process of improving) is evident when other sections of
the Mechanics' Lien Act are considered. Statutory provisions should be "interpreted in
harmony with other provisions in the same statute and with other statutes under the same
and related chapters." Oman v. Davis Sch. Dist., 2008 UT 70, ^ 35, 194 P.3d 956
(citation omitted).
We do so because a statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is
animated by one general purpose and intent. Consequently, each part or section
should be construed in connection with every other part or section so as to produce
a harmonious whole.

or structure or improvement to any premises in any manner." See UTAH CODE ANN. §
38-1-3 (2007).
•j

All Clean cites this case for the proposition that the Utah Supreme Court "believed that
factors in determining whether material or services are lienable include 1) whether the
work enhances the value of the property and 2) whether the work is necessary to make
residences habitable." See Brief of the Appellant at 45. This characterization of the
Supreme Court's opinion takes it out of context. At issue was a lien on a subdivision, not
a single lot. The Supreme Court was only affirming that those contributing to
subdivision "improvements" such as "sewer and water systems" are entitled to a lien on
the subdivision. First of Denver Mortg. Investors v. C. N. Zundel and Associates, 600
P.2d 521 (Utah 1979).
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Berneau v. Martino, 2009 UT 87, ^f 12, 223 P.3d 1128 (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
Section 38-1-4 provides that "[t]he liens granted by this chapter shall extend to
and cover so much of the land whereon such building, structure, or improvement shall
be made." UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-4 (2007) (emphasis added). Here, the legislature
uses the term "improvement" along with the terms "building" and "structure" in the
context of something "made" upon "the land." This connotes that an "improvement" is
something physical.
Similarly, section 38-1-5 provides that "[t]he liens herein provided for shall relate
back to, and take effect as of, the time of the commencement to do work or furnish
materials on the ground for the structure or improvement." UTAH CODE ANN. § 381-5 (2007) (emphasis added). Again, furnishing materials for an "improvement"
connotes that the "improvement" is something physical.
Section 38-1-8 also provides that "[l]iens against two or more buildings or other
improvements owned by the same person may be included in one claim." UTAH CODE
ANN. § 38-1-8 (2007) (emphasis added). You cannot "own" the act or process of
improving, but you can "own" an "improvement" if it connotes something physical.
Pursuant to the foregoing, and giving due consideration to the usage of the word
"or" and the placement of commas, each word in the phrase "construction, alteration, or
improvement" is intended to describe an act or process being applied to "any building [a
physical object] or structure [a physical object] or improvement [a physical object] to any
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premises [a single lot, a subdivision, etc.] in any manner." See UTAH CODE ANN. §38-13 (2007).
Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons performing any services or furnishing
or renting any materials or equipment used in the construction, alteration, or
improvement of any building or structure or improvement to any premises in
any manner . . . shall have a lien upon the property . . . .
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 38-1-3 (2007) (emphasis added).

Accordingly, entitlement to a mechanics' lien is dependent upon whether ones
services, material, or equipment is used: (1) in the construction (the act of constructing),
alteration (the act of altering), or improvement (the act of improving) of any building (a
physical object) in any manner; (2) in the construction (the act of constructing), alteration
(the act of altering), or improvement (the act of improving) of any structure (a physical
object) in any manner; or (3) in the construction (the act of constructing), alteration (the
act of altering), or improvement (the act of improving) of any improvement (a physical
object) to any premises (lot, subdivision, etc.) in any manner.4
"Statutory enactments are to be construed as to render all parts thereof relevant
and meaningful. Likewise, we are compelled to give the statutory language meaning and
to assume that each term in the statute was used advisedly." Labelle v. McKay Dee Hosp.
These categories can also be read as follows: (1) in the construction of any building,
structure, or improvement to any premises in any manner; (2) in the alteration of any
building, structure, or improvement to any premises in any manner; or (3) in the
improvement of any building, structure, or improvement to any premises in any manner.
This alternate way of organizing the categories of entitlement makes no substantive
difference in the meaning of the terms or the conditions giving rise to entitlement to
mechanics' liens.
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Center, 2004 UT 159^[ 16, 89 P.3d 113 (citations omitted). This interpretation gives
meaning to each term in the statute.
In contrast to the foregoing, All Clean relies heavily on a general dictionary
definition that defines the term "improvement" as "a change or addition which makes
land more valuable." See Brief of the Appellant at 41. Accordingly, cleaning,
maintenance and repairs constitute "improvements" since they make what is being
cleaned, maintained or repaired "more valuable" than immediately preceding the
cleaning, maintenance or repair.
However, All Clean's general dictionary definition for the term "improvement"
has already been rejected by the Utah Supreme Court. "Let it be conceded that leveling
land enhances its value and improves its utility. It does not follow that such leveling
constitutes an improvement upon land." See Frehner v. Morton, 424 P.2d 446, 449 (Utah
1967). The Supreme Court clearly did not consider the term "improvement" to mean "a
change or addition which makes land more valuable" as proposed by All Clean.
Even the examples of improvements listed by the dictionary from which All Clean
culled its definition of "improvement" indicate that an "improvement" is more than just
the "value" added to something by cleaning, maintenance or repairs. It defines
"improvement" as "a change or addition to land, property, etc. to make it more valuable,
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such as a house, fence, garage, etc/'5 Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary, 2d
Ed. 917 (1979), attached to the Brief of the Appellant as Exhibit "E" (emphasis added).
Indeed, All Clean's dictionary definition relates remarkably well with the
definitions of the term "improvement" set forth above when it is read as a whole ("a
change or addition to land . . . such as a house, fence, garage, etc.). See, e.g., 53 AM. JUR.
2d Mechanics' Liens §55 (1996) ("anything that enhances the value of the land, or as a
valuable addition made to property or an amelioration in its condition, that amounts to
more than mere repairs, and is intended to enhance the value, beauty, or utility of the
property or to adapt it for new or further purposes"); Duffield Const., Inc. v. Baldwin, 679
N.W.2d 477, 481 (S.D. 2004) (emphasis added) (quoting Webster's Third International
Dictionary 1138 (1976)) ("a permanent addition or betterment of real property that
enhances its capital value and that involves the expenditure of labor or money and is
designed to make the property more useful or valuable as distinguished from ordinary
repairs").
In addition, All Clean's broad interpretation of the term "improvement" renders
most of the statute superfluous. "We will avoid an interpretation which renders portions

5

Utah has adopted "Lord Tenterden's Rule," which provides that "where an enumeration
of specific things is followed by some more general word or phrase, such general word or
phrase is to be held to refer to things of the same kind with respect to a classification
which immediately precedes it." See Frehner v. Morton, 424 P.2d 446, 449 (Utah 1967).
Consequently, the term "etc." in the phrase "such as a house, fence, garage, etc." must
have been intended to refer to other physical object such as water and sewer lines or
decks.
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of, or words in, a statute superfluous or inoperative." Labelle v. McKay Dee Hosp.
Center, 2004 UT 15, H 16, 89 P.3d 113 (citations omitted). If the term "improvement"
means anything that adds value, including cleaning, maintenance or repairs, then the
terms "construction" and "alteration" are superfluous since they would always result in
an "improvement." Similarly, the phrase "construction, alteration, or improvement of
any building or structure" would be engulfed by the phrase "improvement to any
premises in any manner."
All Clean's proposed interpretation of the term "improvement" as anything that
"adds value" also conflicts with the other sections of the Mechanics' Lien Act referenced
above relating to the physical nature of an "improvement." See UTAH CODE ANN. §381-4 (2007) ("the land whereon such building, structure, or improvement shall be made");
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-5 (2007) ("furnish materials on the ground for the structure or
improvement"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-8 (2007) ("buildings or other improvements
owned").
Furthermore, there is nothing the legislative history of the Mechanics' Lien Act
that would evidence a legislative intent to entitle those performing cleaning, maintenance
or repairs to a mechanics' lien. The 1973 amendment to Utah Code § 38-1-3 was
expressly for the purpose of "entitling landscape contractors and nurserymen to the
benefit of the mechanics' lien laws of this state." See Brief of the Appellant at 36-37
(emphasis added). Nothing was mentioned of affording the security of a mechanics' lien
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to those cleaning houses (or carpets), shoveling snow, unclogging drains, washing
windows, or performing routine maintenance work.
However, All Clean's interpretation of Utah Code § 38-1-3 would bestow the
security of a mechanics' lien for these services (and more) and thereby eviscerate the
explicit limitations imposed by the legislature with respect to mechanics' lien entitlement.
By articulating exactly how services, material or equipment must be used for one to be
entitled to a mechanics' lien, the legislature clearly intended to limit the scope of who is
entitled to a mechanics' lien. All Clean's interpretation of section 38-1-3 knows no
bounds.
"One of the cardinal principals of statutory construction is that the courts will look
to the reason, spirit, and sense of the legislation, as indicated by the entire context and
subject matter of the statute dealing with the subject." Mountain States Tel & Tel Co, v.
Payne, 782 P.2d 464, 466 (Utah 1989). "A lien creates an encumbrance on property that
deprives the owner of his ability to convey clear title and impairs his credit." First Sec.
Mortg. Co. v. Hansen, 631 P.2d 919, 922 (Utah 1981). Utah Code § 38-1-3 was never
intended to entitle those cleaning houses (or carpets), shoveling snow, unclogging drains,
washing windows, or performing routine maintenance work to a mechanics' lien.
B.

Applying Section 38-1-3.
Applying section 38-1-3 as it was intended by the legislature establishes that the

trial court correctly determined that All Clean was not entitled to a mechanics' lien.
First, All Clean bore the burden of proving that the "work" or "repair" performed by All
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Clean was used in a manner that entitled All Clean to a mechanics' lien. See Govert
Copier Painting v. Van Leeuwen, 801 P.2d 163, 172 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (holding that
"[t]he burden of proof is on [the lien claimant] to prove that it is entitled to the lien and
has complied with the statute"). However, the trial court's findings of fact make clear
that All Clean failed to present evidence sufficient to establish exactly what "work" or
"repair" was performed by All Clean on the building.
In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the trial court intentionally
characterized the work performed by All Clean generally as "the work" or "the repair."
[R. 266, 267 (Findings of Fact % 6), 269 (Conclusions of Lawffi[5-6)]. All Clean's
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law included the following paragraph
specifically identifying the work allegedly performed:
The work done by [All Clean] included the following: blocking and padding
furniture; equipment setup, take down, and monitoring; water extraction from
floors; application of antimicrobial agent; operation of air movers (fans) and
dehumidifiers; and cleaning and deodorizing of carpets.
[R. 254, 255 (Proposed Findings of Fact ^ 6)].
Timberline Properties objected to this proposed finding of fact as follows:
The Court's ruling from the bench did not include a finding with respect to the
specific work performed by Plaintiff. The Court only referred to the "work or the
repair," which is consistent with the evidence submitted inasmuch as Plaintiff did
not present any testimony with respect to the specific work [] performed.
[R. 241,242 (Objection to Proposed Finding No. 6)]. On March 16, 2010, the trial court
held a teleconference with counsel for All Clean and Timberline Properties to review
Timberline Properties' objections to the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
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Law. [R. 253, 253 (Telephone Conference Worksheet); R. 262,262 (Minutes of
Telephone Conference)].
As evidenced by the trial court's ultimate Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, Timberline Properties' objection to a specific identification of "the work" or "the
repairs" allegedly performed by All Clean was well-taken by the trial court. [R. 266,
266-69 (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law)]. Indeed, All Clean concedes that
"[t]he trial court [] refused to make any detailed finding of fact identifying or describing
'the work done by [All Clean].'" See Brief of the Appellant at 13.
In light of the failure by All Clean to present evidence sufficient for the trial court
to identify what "work" or "repair" was performed by All Clean, the trial court could not,
and this Court cannot on appeal, conclude that the "work" or "repair" performed by All
Clean was "used in the construction, alteration, or improvement of any building or
structure or improvement to any premises in any manner." UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-3.
All Clean simply failed to meet its burden to prove that the work it performed entitled it
to a mechanics' lien.
On appeal, however, All Clean seeks to circumvent its failure to present evidence
sufficient to convince the trial court of what work it performed by alleging that it "is not
challenging a finding of fact made by the trial court" but at the same time arguing that
"the absence of an appropriate finding of fact makes it necessary for [All Clean] to
marshal the record evidence." See Brief of the Appellant at 21. What All Clean is really
asking this Court to do (without explicitly asking or meeting its burdens on appeal) is to
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disregard the trial court's refusal to make a specific finding of fact identifying the work
allegedly performed by All Clean.
This request— a thinly-veiled attack on the trial court's findings of fact—must be
denied for the following reasons: (1) All Clean failed to adequately brief the issue; and
(2) All Clean failed to adequately marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's
refusal to specifically identify as "the work" or "the repair" performed by All Clean.
First, All Clean has not adequately briefed the issue of whether the trial court erred
in refusing to specifically identify as "the work" or "the repair" performed by All Clean.
We decline to address several additional issues [the appellant] raised because he
did not adequately brief those issues. His shortcomings include that he argued
issues in the brief that were not included in his statement of issues, see Utah
R.App. P. 24(a)(5); he failed to indicate where in the record the issues were
preserved for appeal, see id. R. 24(a)(5)(A); [and] he failed to properly brief his
arguments, see id. R. 24(a)(9)
Gish v. Yanke, 2010 UT App. 259,1f 3 n.2, 2010 WL 3721867. A review of All Clean's
brief reveals that it suffers from the same infirmities as the brief referred to in Gish on the
issue of whether the trial court erred in refusing to specifically identify as "the work" or
"the repair" performed by All Clean. See Brief of the Appellant.
Furthermore, All Clean has not marshaled the evidence supporting the trial court's
finding of fact that All Clean performed an unidentified "work" or "repair."
Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires "[a] party
challenging a fact finding [to] first marshal all record evidence that supports the
challenged finding." See also State v. Clark, 2005 UT 75, 1j 17, 124 P.3d 235;
Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Mfg Corp., 2002 UT 94, U 21, 54 P.3d 1177. To
pass this threshold, parties protesting findings of fact must "marshal all the
evidence in support of the finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is
legally insufficient to support the finding even when viewing it in a light most
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favorable to the court below." Clark 2005 UT 75, \ 17, 124 P.3d 235 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT 35, f 24,
140 P.3d 1200.
An appellant "must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of
competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the
appellant resists." Id. at *[} 77 (internal quotations omitted). Moreover, an appellant
may not simply review the evidence presented at trial, nor may she "re-argue the
factual case [she] presented in the trial court." Id. If an appellant argues that no
evidence supports a factual finding, the burden to marshal does not then shift to
the appellee; rather, the appellee may prove that the appellant did not meet her
marshaling burden by presenting a "scintilla" of evidence supporting the district
court's finding. Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp., 2002 UT 94, \ 22, 54
P.3d 1177.
Parduhn v. Bennett, 2005 UT 22, ^f 25, 112 P.3d 495. Every "scrap" of evidence includes
all inferences from the evidence. See State v. Valdez, 203 UT App 100, ^f 20 n.l 1, 68
P.3d 1052.
This does not mean that the party may simply provide an exhaustive review of all
evidence presented at trial. Id. at \ 12 n. 1. Rather, appellants must provide a
precisely focused summary of all the evidence supporting the findings they
challenge. Id. This summary must correlate all particular items of evidence with
the challenged findings and then convince us that the trial court erred in the
assessment of that evidence to its findings. W. Valley City v. Majestic Inv., Co.,
818P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct.App.1991).
Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82,1}77, 100 P.3d 1177.
Once the evidence is marshaled, only then is an appellate court in a position to
fairly evaluate whether the trial court's findings of fact were adequately supported by
evidence.
A trial court's findings of fact will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. In
order to establish that a particular finding of fact is clearly erroneous, an appellant
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must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that
despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be
against the clear weight of the evidence. If the evidence is inadequately
marshaled, [the Utah Supreme Court] assumes that all findings are adequately
supported by the evidence.
Id. at Tf 19 (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted) (emphasis added);
see also United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT
35, T| 27, 140 P.3d 1200 ("We repeatedly have warned of the grim consequences parties
face when they fail to fulfill the marshaling requirement.").
In this case, All Clean purports to marshal the evidence that "identifies or relates
to the nature of the work done by [All Clean]." See Brief of Appellant at 21.
Accordingly, All Clean does not even purport to marshal only the evidence supporting
the trial court's refusal to specifically identify as "the work" or "the repair" as would be
required to challenge the trial court's findings of fact.
Indeed, a cursory review of the "evidence" presented by All Clean reveals that it is
not "a precisely focused summary of all the evidence supportins the findings" challenged
by All Clean. Chen, 2004 UT at ^f 77 (emphasis added). To the contrary, most of the
"evidence" marshaled by All Clean is intended to undermine the trial court's refusal to
specifically identify as "the work" or "the repair" performed by All Clean. See Brief of
the Appellant at 24-30.
In contrast, the evidence supporting the trial court's refusal to specifically identify
as "the work" or "the repair" performed by All Clean includes Mr. Olsen's testimony that
he did not have personal knowledge regarding the work performed by All Clean, and
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Timberline Properties' repeated hearsay objections, which were sustained by the trial
court each time Mr. Olsen tried to testify regarding the work performed by All Clean. [R.
295 (Trial Transcript at 21, 24, 26, 29, 32)].
Of particular note is the trial court's response to the last of Timberline Properties'
hearsay objections, which was made at the close of All Clean's presentation of evidence
regarding "the work" or "the repairs." In response to a question regarding "pages from
an estimate prepared by Cherie White with Travelers Insurance," Mr. Olsen testified that
"[t]his represents the value that [Travelers Insurance] put to the scope of work that was
necessary and performed on this job and work their reimbursement would have been
based on." [R. 295 (Trial Transcript at 31-32)].
Timberline Properties objected to this response as follows: "Your honor, I would
object to this characterization that it was the work performed on the job. Travelers
wasn't there, so they don't know what work was performed. And I don't think they
presented any evidence of what work was actually performed." [R. 295 (Trial Transcript
at 32)]. The trial court responded "Agreed." [R. 295 (Trial Transcript at 32)].
These exchanges with the trial court reveal that the trial court did not believe that
All Clean had established the exact nature of "the work" or "the repairs" and supports its
refusal to specifically identify "the work" or "the repair" in its findings of fact. More
importantly for purposes of this appeal, these portions of the record are not mentioned in
the section denominated by All Clean as fulfilling the marshalling requirement. See Brief
of the Appellant at 21-30.
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It is also noteworthy that All Clean's marshalling of the "evidence" includes
extraneous portions of the record that were not presented as evidence at trial and that tend
to undermine the trial court's refusal to specifically identify as "the work" or "the repair"
performed by All Clean. See Brief of the Appellant at 21-23 (citing to responses to
interrogatories and All Clean's summary judgment motion). These portions of the record
are inappropriate for purposes of marshalling the evidence in support of the trial court's
refusal to specifically identify "the work" or "the repair" in its findings of fact.
All Clean also mischaracterizes some of the evidence presented to the trial court in
its "marshalling" section. Although it was established that Mr. Olsen did not possess
personal knowledge regarding the work performed by All Clean, and the trial court
upheld Timberline Properties' hearsay objection, All Clean cites to this portion of the
record and states that it represents "Mr. Olsen stating his general familiarity with the
work done by [All Clean] on the property of Timberline [Properties]." See Brief of the
Appellant at 25. The hearsay objection was sustained. [R. 295 (Trial Transcript at 21)].
Similarly, no evidence was presented that an insurance company visited the
property or otherwise witnessed the work performed by All Clean. [R. 295 (Trial
Transcript)]. As noted above, when Mr. Olsen tried to testify that a document from
Travelers Insurance "represented] the value that [Travelers Insurance] put to the scope of
work that was necessary and performed on this job," the trial court sustained Timberline
Properties' objection. [R. 295 (Trial Transcript at 31-32)].
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However, All Clean still cites this section of the record and states that it represents
"Mr. Olsen stating that the insurance company agreed with the scope of work identified
by [All Clean] but disagreed with unit pricing." See Brief of the Appellant at 27. All
Clean also cites testimony given by Mr. Olsen that generally an "insurance adjuster goes
on site to verify information submitted by [All Clean]," see Brief of the Appellant at 28,
but this testimony (and the rest of the evidence presented at trial) does not evidence that
an insurance adjuster came to the Property in this case or that Travelers Insurance had
any knowledge concerning specifically what "work" or "repairs" were performed on the
Property in this case.
Furthermore, All Clean has included the closing arguments of counsel and
comments made by the trial court as "evidence" regarding "the work" or "the repair"
performed by All Clean. See Brief of the Appellant at 29-30. These arguments and
comments do not constitute "evidence" supporting the trial court's findings of fact as is
required when marshaling the evidence.
In addition to the foregoing deficiencies in All Clean's attempt to marshal the
evidence, All Clean has not alleged, let alone demonstrated, that the evidence supporting
the trial court's findings of fact, when viewing it in a light most favorable to the trial
court, is legally insufficient to support the finding. See United Park City Mines Co. v.
Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT 35, f 24, 140 P.3d 1200. Consequently,
the Court must assume that the trial court was justified in refusing to specifically identify
the work performed by All Clean and must conclude, as set forth above, that All Clean
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failed to meet its burden to prove that the work it performed entitled it to a mechanics'
lien.
Even if All Clean can successfully argue that the trial court'sfindingsof fact were
inadequate with regard to "the work" or "the repair" performed by All Clean, the work
that All Clean seeks for this Court to find it performed was not used in a manner that
entitles All Clean to a mechanics' lien. According to All Clean, the work performed
"included moving contents, blocking and padding furniture, water extraction from the
floor, use of dehumidifiers, application of antimicrobial agent to the wet floor area, use of
fans or air movers, and cleaning the floor." See Brief of the Appellant at 51.
Pursuant to the interpretation of Utah Code § 38-1-3 set forth above, the services,
equipment and materials provided pursuant to these activities were used in the cleaning
of a mess in a building, not in the construction (the act of constructing), alteration (the act
of altering), or improvement (the act of improving) of a building (a physical object).
Furthermore, the services, equipment and materials provided by All Clean were not used
on a structure (a physical object) or improvement (a physical object) to any premises (lot,
subdivision, etc.) in any manner.
Although All Clean repeatedly notes that bacteria and mold growth could have
occurred in the building,6 the potential that the services they performed prevented
bacteria or mold growth does not change the nature of those services from cleaning or
maintaining the building to constructing, altering, or improving the building. A good
6

See, e.g., Brief of the Appellant at 7, 9, 32, 51, 52.
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housecleaner helps prevent bacteria and mold growth by scrubbing down the toilets and
showers. A good snow remover helps prevent driveways and sidewalks from structural
damage (cracking) by removing the snow.
There is simply nothing in the legislative history or otherwise to support a
conclusion that the legislature intended to allow mechanics' liens for the removal of
water, dirt, or anything else incident to the cleaning of a building when it used the word
"improvement" in conjunction with the words "construction" and "alteration."
Entitlement to a mechanics' lien depends on how services, materials or equipment are
used. In this case, All Clean's services, materials and equipment were simply not used in
a manner that entitles All Clean to a mechanics' lien.
III.

ATTORNEYS' FEES.
"Generally, an attorney fee award is within the court's discretion and will not be

reversed absent an abuse of discretion." Robertson v. GEM Ins. Co., 828 P.2d 496, 499
(Utah Ct. App. 1992). In Utah, the general rule is that "attorney fees cannot be recovered
by a prevailing party unless a statute or contract authorizes such an award." Hughes v.
Cafferty, 2004 UT 22, f 21, 89 P.3d 148.
Utah Code § 38-1-18 provides that "in any action brought to enforce any lien
under this chapter the successful party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable attorneys'
fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed as costs in the action." UTAH CODE
ANN. § 38-1-18(1) (2009). "An appeal from a suit brought to enforce a lien qualifies as
part of 'an action' for purposes of this section." Richards v. Security Pacific Nat. Bank,
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849 P.2d 606, 612 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). As acknowledged by this Court, "[t]he
language of this statute is mandatory, not discretionary." Reeves v. Steinfeldt, 915 P.2d
1073, 1079 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
In this case, Timberline Properties was the "successful party" with respect to All
Clean's mechanics' lien claim. [R. 266, 269 (Conclusions of Law Tf 6)]. Consequently,
Timberline Properties should have been awarded its attorneys' fees by the trial court. In
addition, Timberline Properties should be awarded its attorneys' fees on appeal. See
Reeves, 915 P.2d at 1079; Richards, 849 P.2d at 612. This is true even if the Court basis
its decision on the acceptance-of-the-benefits doctrine. See, e.g., Trees v. Lewis, 738
P.2d 612, 614 (Utah 1987).
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Timberline Properties respectfully requests that the
Court dismiss All Clean's appeal pursuant to the acceptance-of-the-benefits doctrine. In
the alternative, Timberline Properties respectfully requests that the Court affirm the trial
court's conclusion that All Clean was not entitled to a mechanics' lien and reverse the
trial court's failure to award Timberline Properties its attorneys' fees relating to All
Clean's mechanics' lien claim. Timberline Properties also respectfully requests an award
of its attorneys' fees on appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this23*day of December, 2010.
SMITH KNOWLES, P.C.

rj > Q K
Garrett A. Walker
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees/Cross-Appellants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed two true and correct copies of the
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEES AND CROSS-APELLANTS, postage prepaid, to
the following this y j aay of December, 2010:
L. Miles LeBaron
Tyler J. Jensen
Jacob D. Briggs
LEBARON & JENSEN, P.C

476 West Heritage Park Blvd., Ste. 104
Layton, Utah 84041
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant/Cross-Appellee
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Affidavit of Garrett A. Walker

45

EXHIBIT "A

Garrett A. Walker (12708)
Dana T. Farmer (8371)
SMITH KNOWLES, P.C.
4723 Harrison Blvd., Suite 200
Ogden, UT 84403
Telephone: (801) 476-0303
Facsimile: (801) 476-0399
Email: gwalker@smithknowles.com
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ALL CLEAN, INC., DBA THE FLOOD
CO., a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff/Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

AFFIDAVIT OF FARRELL J.
DEHART

\TQ.

TIMBERLINE PROPERTIES, a Utah
general partnership; JAMES B. FARRELL,
an individual; FARRELL J. DEHART, an
individual; JOHN or JANE DOES 1-5;

Appellate Case No. 20100394-CA

Defendants/Appellees/Cross-Appellants.
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF WEBER

)
:ss
)

I, FARRELL J. DEHART, being first duly sworn upon his oath, hereby depose
and state as follows:

1.

I am listed as a defendant in the above-captioned matter along with my

business partner, James B. Farrell, and our partnership, Timberline Properties
(collectively referred to herein as "Timberline Properties").
2.

I am personally familiar with the facts and circumstances surrounding the

present dispute between the parties hereto, and have personal knowledge of the testimony
herein.
3.

The trial court in the above-captioned matter entered a judgment against

Timberline Properties in the amount of $1,841.07.
4.

On March 22, 2010,1 personally mailed a check to All Clean in the in the

amount of $ 1,841.07 to satisfy the judgment.
5.

On April 7, 2010, All Clean negotiated the check. A copy of the negotiated

check is attached hereto as Exhibit "A".
6.

On May 18, 2010, Timberline Properties sold a piece of property not

involved in this lawsuit (but located in Weber County where the Judgment had been
recorded) to a third-party.
7.

In conjunction with that sale, Timberline Properties was forced to place

$3,673.00 in escrow because the judgment entered by the trial court was still
encumbering the property even though All Clean had already negotiated the check

Y \WD DATA\DEHA02\09-0179\A0406367 DOC

2

attached hereto as Exhibit "A". A copy of the Settlement Statement is attached hereto as
Exhibit "B".
8.

These funds are still being held in escrow.

DATED this 2/j) day of December, 2010.

Farrell J. DeHaiL-7
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
STATE OF UTAH
ss

COUNTY OF WEBER

)

On the Is? day of December, 2010, personally appeared before me, Farrell J.
DeHart, who being by me duly sworn did say that he is the signer of the foregoing
instrument and who duly acknowledge to me that he eXpejuted the same.
OAV1DLKNOWLES
HOTAftt PUBLIC* STATE OlUTAH
COMMISSION NO. 681090
C O M M . EXP. 12/17/2013

NOTARY PUBLIC

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Z ^ a y of December, 2010.
SMITH KNOWLES, P.C.

<

^-©arlaT. Farmer
Garrett A. Walker
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees/Cross-Appellants
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EXHIBIT "A"

UWIOINO ^DU<J-UZbO

A U S Department of Housing
and Urban Development

B Type of Loan
1 [)FHA

2 []FMHA

4 [ }VA

5 [ ] Conv Ins

]Conv Unins
7 Loan Number

6 File Number
148603

Settlement Statement

8 Mortgage Ins Case No
This form is furnished to give you a statement of actual settlement costs Amounts paid to and by the settlement
agent are shown Items marked ("POC") were paid outside the closing they are shown here for information
purposes and are not included in the totals
Andrea LLC by Javier Chavez Manager

C Note
D Name of Borrower
E Name of Seller

Farrell De Hart General Partner
James Farrell General Partner

F Name of Lender

Amenca First Credit Union P O Box 9639 Ogden UT 84409 9998
Township Range Weber County Utah

G Property Location

4874 Hamson Boulevard Ogden UT 84403
Bonneville Supencr Title

H Settlement Agent

TIN

Ogden

870431430

5734 South 14751 ast #100 Ogden UT 84403

Place of Settlement
I Settlement Date

Proration Date

5/18/2010

ttrifa*9m«>tt***

5/19/2010

\ i. i ~ » i E*m*Ba&m&*«*>*

100

Gross amount due from borrower

400

101

Contract sales pnce

1401

Contract sales pnce

102

Personal property

[402

Personal property

103

Settlement charges to borrower (line 140C)

403

104

404

105

405

* TZ^TJ

Gross amount due to seller
$650 000 00

m^*w*Mhm##*k* t & a t*^i**i*^*m*ti>+ii MWkMid
106

City/town taxes

[406

City/town taxes

107

County taxes

[407

County taxes

108

Assessments

1408

Assessments

May Rent

409
410

May Rent

109
110

5/1/2010

to 5/19/2010

112
120

5/1/2010

3 787 40

to 5/19/2010

411

111

412
Gross amount due from borrower
or1r*^Jjjfonhe"bQrrowe^

m

WT*

[420

Gross amount due to seller

500

^ e % c « W ^ ^

$653 787 40

201

Deposit or earnest money

501

Excess deposit (see instructions)

202

Principal amount of new loan(s)

502

Settlement charges to seller (line 1400)

203

Existing loan(s) taken subject to

503

Existing loan(s) taken subject to
Payoff of first mortgage loan

$3 020 00
$470 390 21

204

504

205

505

Payoff of second mortgage loan

206
207

506
507

2005 thru 2009 Del Taxes 07 014 0026
2005 thru 2009 Del Taxes 07 014 0025

$52 742 38
71 691 79

508

Seller Carry Back

$56 657 00

509

Escrow Funds Payoff Judgement Case#08090819:

208

Seller Carry Back

209

hMmmtton^mimmkv 9,£tt
210

City/town taxes

211

County taxes

212

Assessments

1/1/2010

to 5/19/2010

m^tslbnlTisunaq^^lter

JSLadBaHJKjttL
510

City/town taxes

511

County taxes

512

Assessments

213

513

214
215

514

216

516

217

517

218

518

219

519

220

Total paid by/for borrower

WM^^MMS^MM!E

520

%

1/1/2010

*

^

J

F

$3 673 00
g

J~W^

$4 429 72

to 5/19/2010

Total reduction in amount due seller

$662,60410

jtm^hmamm^mmMKk.mm g f ¥ ¥

301

Gross amount due from borrower (line 1201

601

Gross amount due to seller (line 420)

$653 787 40

302

Less amount paid by/for borrower (line 220)

602

Less total reduction in amount due seller(fine 520)

$662 604 10

303

CASH (X)FROM QTO BORROWER

603

CASH (X)FROM QTO SELLER

Tax proration based on taxes for the proceeding oi estimates of the current year

/

m

$8 816 70

EXHIBIT "B"

Paid From

Division of commission (line 700) as follows

Borrower's

Sellers

Funds at

Funds at

Settlement

Settlement

701
702
703

Paid From

Total sales/broker commission

Commission paid at settlement

704
705

^^^iiisEK^E^Sir^^^^^^^^^HZ^S;
[801

Loan origination fee

802

Loan discount

803

Appraisal fee

804

Credit report

805

Lender s inspection fee

806

Mortgage insurance application fee

807

Assumption fee
Tax Service Fee

809

Underwnting Fee

810

Document Preparation Fee

811

Flood Certification Fee

812

Processing Fee

813

Account Setup

to

814

Legal Fees

to

815

Loan Fee

901

Interest from

America First Credit Union
Amenca First Credit Union

Amenca First Credit Union
7**^*L. $ISM

jms teqmred by leloWto be paid jj
902

Mortgage insurance premium for

903

Hazard insurance premium for

g g - T - E g fflBj

904

905

R

1001

VA Funding Fee

len»

&

hWHMk..

IP

Miit

Hazard insurance

1002

Mortgage insurance

1003

City property taxes

1004

County property taxes

1005

Annual assessments (maint)

1006

Aggregate Adj

1007
1008
1009

1101

Settlement or closing fee

1102

Abstract or title search

1103

Title examination

1104

Title insurance binder

1105

Document preparation

1106

Notary fees

1107

Attorney s fees to

1108

Title insurance

250 00

to Bonneville Supenor Title Company Inc

to

Bonneville Superior Title Company Inc

50 00

to

Bonneville Supenor Title Company Inc

2 695 00

includes above items no
includes above items no
1109

Lender's coverage

1110

Owner's coverage

1111

Endorsements

$2 695 00
$650 000 00
111 4 and 103 4 to Bonneville Supenor Title Company Inc

1112

Counerfee

1113

Reconveyance fee

to

Bonneville Superior Title Company Inc

25 00

1200HJ Gof#mmentrecordftffiand transfer charges
1201

Recording fees

1202

City/county tax/stamps

1203

State tax7stamps

1204

Recording Assignment Fee

Deed $25 00 Mortgage $45 00 Sub $30 00

1205

1206
- A d d ^ a l segment cfarges
1301

Survey

1302

Pest inspection

1303

Wire Fee

«*»«

"W^jF

wmmxrms^^

_

\4M-\

1304
1305
1400

Total settlement charges (entered on lines 103 section J and 502 section K)

3 020 00

and disbursements made on my account or by me in this transaction I further certify that I have received^copy
avedVcopy ofofHUD-1
HUD-1SetUemejiLStatefh<
Set^eme^iyState^ent

VAndrea LLC by Javier Chavez, Manager

> Hart General

P
Hhncd/L* MJJ./J
James Farrell. General Partner

.

To the best of my knowledge the HUD 1 Settlement Statement which I have prepared is a true ar>d accurate account of the funds which were received and have been or will be
disbursed by the undersigned as part of the settlement of this transaction
(_/

5"- IP~ aLGfO
Bonneville Superior Title Company Inc
Date
SELLER'S AND/OR PURCHASER'S STATEMENT Seller's and Purchaser's signature hereon acknowledges his/their approval of tax prorations and signifies their
understanding that prorations were based on taxes for the preceding year, or estimates for the current year and in the event of any change for the current year all necessary
adjustments must be made between Seller and Purchaser likewise any default in delinquent taxes will be reimbursed to Title Company by the Seller
Title Company in its capacity as Escrow Agent, is and has been authorized to deposit all funds it receives in this transaction in any finanaal institution, whether affiliated
or not Such financial institution may provide Title Company computer accounting and audit services directly or through a separate entity which if affiliated with Title Company
may charge the finanaal institution reasonable and proper compensation therefore and retain any profits therefrom Any escrow fees paid by any party involved in this
transaction shall only be for checkwnting and input to the computers but not for aforesaid accounting and audit services Title Company shall not be liable for any interest or
other charges on the earnest money and shall be undc r no duty to invest or reinvest funds held by it at any time Sellers and Purchasers hereby acknowledge and consent to the
deposit of the escrow money in finanaal institutions with which Title Company has or may have other banking relationships and further consent to the retention by Title Company
and/or its affiliates of any and all benefits (including advantageous interest rates on loans) Title Company and/or its affiliates may receive from such finanaal institutions by
reason of their maintenance of said escrow accounts
ThP narhps havp rparl thp ahnvp <;pntpnop<; rpronni7P that thp rprjtatmn<; hprptn arp matpnal anrpp jn <;amp and rprr»nni7« TJ*IA Cnm/anv is rplvino nn thP *arr»P

Purchasers/Borrowers

Andrea LLC, by Javier Chavez, Manager

Sellers

^art General PartHer

~~~~~

Japfe&Farrell, General Partner
WARNING It is a crime to knowingly make false statements to the United States on this or ar^y^ther similar form Penalties upon conviction can Include a fine and
wnpnsonment For details see Title 18 U S Code Section 1001 and Section 1010

EXHIBIT "B"

Garrett A. Walker (12708)
Dana T. Farmer (8371)
SMITH KNOWLES, P.C.
4723 Harrison Blvd., Suite 200
Ogden, UT 84403
Telephone: (801) 476-0303
Facsimile: (801) 476-0399
Email: gwalker@smithknowles.com
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ALL CLEAN, INC., DBA THE FLOOD
CO., a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff/Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

AFFIDAVIT OF GARRETT A.
WALKER

I/O

Vo.

TIMBERLINE PROPERTIES, a Utah
general partnership; JAMES B. FARRELL,
an individual; FARRELL J. DEHART, an
individual; JOHN or JANE DOES 1-5;

Appellate Case No. 20100394-CA

Defendants/Appellees/Cross-Appellants.
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF WEBER

)
:ss
)

I, GARRETT A. WALKER, being first duly sworn upon his oath, hereby depose
and state as follows:

1.

I am a licensed member of the Utah State Bar in good standing and have

served as counsel for the defendants in the above-captioned matter since shortly before
the bench trial in this matter on February 1, 2010.
2.

As such, I am personally familiar with the facts and circumstances

surrounding the present dispute between the parties hereto, and have personal knowledge
of the testimony herein.
3.

The trial court in the above-captioned matter entered a judgment in favor of

Plaintiff All Clean, Inc. against my client, Timberline Properties, in the amount of
$1,841.07.
4.

On May 12, 2010,1 communicated with Jacob Briggs, counsel for All

Clean, and indicated to him that Timberline Properties was selling a piece of property not
involved in this lawsuit but that was located in Weber County and requested that he
execute a Satisfaction of Judgment for the purpose of clearing title to the property since I
had been told by Timberline Properties that a check in the full amount of the judgment
had been tendered to All Clean and All Clean had negotiated the check.
5.

On May 13, 2010, Jacob Briggs communicated to me that he was hesitant

to sign a Satisfaction of Judgment.

Y:\WD_DATA\DEHA02\09-0179\A0406368.DOC
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6.

As of today, I have still not received a Satisfaction of Judgment from Jacob

Briggs or anyone else in relation to this case.
DATED thisZl^lay of December, 2010.

_Gairett A. Walker
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF WEBER

: ss
)

On the & >
day of December, 2010, personally appeared before me,ijarrett
A. Walker, who being by me duly sworn did say that he is the signer of the fo/egojflg
instrument and who duly acknowledge to me that he executed the sam$
DAVID LKNOWLES
NOTARY PUBLIC • STATE of W W
COMMISSION NO. 681090

NOTARY PUBLIC

COMM. EXP. 12/17/2013

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED thisZ^ay of December, 2010.
SMITH KNOWLES, P.C.

^fe^ULQife^,
)snan. Farmer
Garrett A. Walker
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees/Cross-Appellants
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